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Abstract—Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) far
exceed the navigation accuracies provided by other state-of-the-
art sensors for aerospace applications. This can support the
development of low-cost and high performance navigation and
guidance architectures for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
and, in conjunction with suitable data link technologies, the
provision of Automated Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
functionalities for cooperative Sense-and-Avoid (SAA). In non-
cooperative SAA, the adoption of GNSS can also provide the key
positioning and, in some cases, attitude data (using multiple
antennas) required for automated collision avoidance. A key
limitation of GNSS for both cooperative (ADS) and non-
cooperative applications is represented by the achievable levels of
integrity. Therefore, an Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation
(ABIA) solution is proposed to support the development of an
integrity-augmented SAA architecture suitable for both
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. The performance of
this Integrity-Augmented SAA (IAS) architecture was evaluated
in representative simulation case studies. Additionally, the ABIA
performances in terms of False Alarm Rate (FAR) and Detection
Probability (DP) were assessed and compared with Space-Based
and Ground-Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS/GBAS).
Simulation results show that the proposed IAS architecture is
capable of performing high-integrity conflict detection and
resolution when GNSS is used as the primary source of
navigation data and there is a synergy with SBAS/GBAS in
providing suitable (predictive and reactive) integrity flags in all
flight phases. Therefore, the integration of ABIA with
SBAS/GBAS is a clear opportunity for future research towards
the development of a Space-Ground-Avionics Augmentation
Network (SGAAN) for UAS SAA and other safety-critical
aviation applications.
Keywords—Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation; Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle; Unmanned Aircraft System; Sense-and-Avoid;
Obstacle Detection; Obstacle Avoidance; Global Navigation
Satellite System.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key challenges encountered by the aviation
community for integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS) into non-segregated airspace is the provision of a
certifiable Sense-And-Avoid (SAA) capability [1]. In addition
to Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Ground
Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS), Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) augmentation can take the form of
additional information being provided and processed by other
on-board avionic sensors and systems. In most cases, the
additional avionics sensors/systems operate via separate
principles than the GNSS and this property can be exploited by
suitable data fusion algorithms to generate suitable warnings in
case of GNSS data degradation or losses, thereby allowing a
timely reaction/correction by the human pilot or by Unmanned
Aircraft (UA) automatic flight control systems. A system such
as this is called Avionics-Based or Aircraft-Based
Augmentation System (ABAS). ABAS, GBAS and SBAS
address (using different but synergic approaches) all four
cornerstones of GNSS performance augmentation, namely:
accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity [2-4]. The
ABAS approach is particularly well suited to increase the
levels of integrity and accuracy (as well as continuity in multi-
sensor data fusion architectures) of GNSS in a variety of
mission- and safety-critical applications. In UAS applications,
airworthiness requirements for both cooperative and non-
cooperative SAA impose stringent GNSS data integrity
requirements, which cannot be fulfilled by current SBAS and
GBAS technologies in some of the most demanding
operational tasks. Therefore, a properly designed Avionics
Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system would allow an
extended spectrum of autonomous and safety-critical
operations including UAS SAA [4]. The ABIA system
performs a continuous monitoring of GNSS integrity levels in
flight by analysing the relationships between aircraft
manoeuvres and GNSS accuracy degradations or signal losses
(Doppler shift, multipath, antenna obscuration, signal-to-noise
ratio, jamming, etc.). In case of any detected or predicted
integrity threshold violation, the ABIA system provides
suitable warning or caution signals to the UA Automatic Flight
Control System (AFCS) and to the remote Ground Control
Station (GCS), thereby allowing timely correction manoeuvres
to be performed. This increased level of integrity could
provide a pathway to support unrestricted access of UAS to all
classes of airspace. Furthermore, using suitable data link and
data processing technologies on the ground, a certified ABAS
capability could be a core element of a future GNSS Space-
Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN) for UAS
SAA and other safety-critical aircraft/UA applications.
II. ABIA SYSTEM
Previous research on ABIA systems demonstrated the
potential of this technology to enhance GNSS integrity
performance in a variety of tasks including experimental flight
test/flight inspection, precision approach and automatic
landing [4-7]. Based on these results, an advanced ABIA
system was developed for UAS applications (Fig. 1). The
ABIA system addresses both the predictive and reactive nature
of GNSS integrity augmentation by producing suitable
integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in case of
predicted/ascertained GNSS data losses or unacceptable signal
degradations exceeding the Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) specified for each phase of flight, and providing
guidance information to the UAS pilot/autopilot to prevent or
avoid further data losses/degradations. In this system, the on-
board sensors provide information on the aircraft relevant
flight parameters (navigation data, engine settings, etc.) to an
Integrity Flag Generator (IFG), which is also connected to the
GNSS receiver. Using the available data on GNSS and the
relevant aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals are
generated, which are downlinked to the UAS GCS and used
by a Flight Path Optimisation Module (FPOM). Based on the
visual and/or aural cautions and warnings generated in the
GCS, the UAS pilot can uplinks steering commands through
suitable Line-Of-Sight (LOS) or Beyond LOS (BLOS) data
links to the on-board avionic system. Alternatively, when the
ABIA autonomous mode is activated, optimal manoeuvres are
automatically executed by the UA AFCS to avoid GNSS data
degradations or losses.
Fig. 1. ABIA system architecture for UAS applications.
The IFG produces caution and warning integrity flags in
line with specified times-to-alert [6, 7]. Caution Integrity Flags
(CIFs) are predictive annunciations that the GNSS data
delivered to the avionics system are going to exceed the RNP
thresholds specified for the current and planned flight
operational tasks (GNSS alert status). Warning Integrity Flags
(WIFs) are reactive annunciations that the GNSS data delivered
to the avionics system have exceeded the RNP thresholds
specified for the current flight operational task (GNSS fault
status). In line with these definitions, the ABIA Time-to-Alert
is differentiated in two categories: Time-to-Caution (TTC) and
Time-to-Warning (TTW). TTC is the minimum time allowed
for the caution flag to be provided to the user before the onset
of a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition; TTW is the
maximum time allowed from the moment a GNSS fault
resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the moment that
the ABIA system provides a warning flag to the user.
III. ABIA INTEGRITY FLAG GENERATION
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal
losses in aviation applications were analysed. Analysing these
phenomena and developing suitable mathematical models was
essential in order to design the ABIA IFG module [6]. Fig. 2
shows the architecture of the IFG module and input/output
data. The ABIA IFG module is designed to provide CIF and
WIF alerts in real-time (i.e., in accordance with the specified
TTC and TTW requirements in all relevant flight phases). The
IFG module inputs are from the GNSS receiver and other UA
sensors. The Integrity Flags Layer (IFL) uses a set of
predefined CIF/WIF threshold parameters to trigger the
generation of both caution and warning flags associated with
antenna obscuration, Doppler shift, multipath, carrier-to-noise,
interference and satellite geometry degradations [6, 7]. The
masking integrity flag criteria are:
 When the current A/C manoeuvre will lead to less the 4
satellite in view, the CIF shall be generated.
 When only 4 satellites are in view and one (or more)
satellite(s) elevation angle is less than 10 degrees, the CIF
shall be generated.
 When less than 4 satellites are in view, the WIF shall be
generated.
 When only 4 satellites are in view and one (or more)
satellite(s) elevation angle is less than 5 degrees, the WIF
shall be generated.
Fig. 2. ABIA IFG module architecture.
In order to generate CIFs and WIFs that are consistent with
current GNSS RNP, the Horizontal and Vertical Accuracy
(HA/VA) requirements are introduced in the various flight
phases.  The 1-σ Estimated Position Error (EPE), Estimated 
Horizontal Error (EHE) and Estimated Vertical Errors (EVE)
of a GNSS receiver are calculated using the Position Dilution
of Precision (PDOP), Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP)
or Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) respectively. The
Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is defined as the radius of a
circle in the horizontal plane, with its centre being at the true
position, which describes the region required to contain the
indicated horizontal position with a specified probability for a
particular navigation mode. Similarly, the Vertical Alert Limit
(VAL) is defined as half the length of a segment on the vertical
axis, with its centre being at the true position, which describes
the region required to contain the indicated vertical position
with a specified probability for a particular navigation mode.
Hence, the DOP integrity flags criteria are the following:
 When the EHE exceeds the HA 95% or the VA 95%
alert requirements, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the EHE exceeds the HAL or the EVE exceeds the
VAL, the WIF shall be generated.
Multipath integrity flags were defined using the Early-Late
Phase (ELP) observable and the range error [8]. As described
in [7], the multipath integrity flags criteria are the following:
 When the Early-Late-Phase (ELP) exceeds 0.1 radians,
the caution integrity flag shall be generated.
 When the multipath range error exceeds 1 meter, the
warning integrity flag shall be generated.
 When the multipath ranging error exceeds 2 metres and
the aircraft flies in proximity of the ground (below 500 ft
AGL), the warning integrity flag shall be generated.
In order to define the integrity thresholds associated with
Doppler and fading effects, a dedicated analysis of the GNSS
receiver tracking performance was performed. When the GNSS
measurement errors exceed certain thresholds, the receiver
loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and carrier
tracking loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold
regions, only Monte Carlo simulations of the GNSS receiver in
different dynamics and SNR conditions can determine the
receiver tracking performance [8, 9]. Numerous sources of
measurement errors affect the Phase Lock Loop (PLL),
Frequency Lock Loop (FLL) and Delay Lock Loop (DLL).
PLL, FLL and DLL are adopted in Scalar Tracking Loops
(STL) as well as Vector Tracking Loops (VTL) are considered
as part of this research. Error models described in [10] allow
determining the effective Carrier-to-Noise (C/N଴) ratio
corresponding to the receiver tracking thresholds. The integrity
flag criterion applicable to the ABIA system is:
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where (C/N଴)୔୐୐ is the minimum C/N଴ for PLL tracking,(C/N଴)୊୐୐is the minimum C/N଴ for FLL tracking,(C/N଴)ୈ୐୐is the minimum C/N଴ for DLL tracking,(C/N଴)୔୐୐ା୊୐୐is the minimum C/N଴ for combined PLL and
FLL tracking and (C/N଴)୚୘୐is the minimum C/N଴ for VTL
based tracking. Numerical solution of the above equation
shows that the weak link in unaided avionics GNSS receivers is
the carrier tracking loop threshold (greater sensitivity to
dynamics stress). Therefore, the (C/N଴)୔୐୐ threshold can be
adopted in these cases. Using these theoretical and
experimental threshold values, we can also calculate the
receiver Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) performance for the various
cases of practical interest, as described in [7, 10]. When
available, flight test data collected in representative portions of
the aircraft operational flight envelope (or the results of Monte
Carlo simulation) can be used. Taking an additional 5%
margin on the 3-sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF, the
following additional criteria are introduced for the ABIA
integrity thresholds:
 When either 42.25° ≤ 3σ୔୐୐ ≤ 45° or 0.2375T ≤
3σ୊୐୐ ≤ 0.25T or 0.05d ≤ 3σୈ୐୐ ≤ d, the CIF shall be
generated.
 When either 3σ୔୐୐ > 45°or 3σ୊୐୐ > 1/4ܶor 3σୈ୐୐ >
݀the WIF shall be generated.
In avionics receivers, lock detectors are used to assess if the
satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked. Code lock
detection is very similar to estimating the received C/N଴,
inferring that the receiver is operating on or near the correlation
peak. The spread spectrum processing gain (G୮) is defined as
the ratio of the spread bandwidth to the unspread (baseband)
bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-correlation Signal-
to-Noise (S/N) ratio is calculated from [10]:(S/N)୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = (S/N)୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ (2)
The relationship between C/N଴ and jammer signal power
(J) is given by [11]:
େ
୒
= [C/N଴]/ቈ1 + ቀిొబቁቀె౏ቁୖୡ ቉ (3)
where N଴ is the thermal noise power spectral density, Rc is the
P-code chipping rate (chips/s), S is the signal power received at
the GNSS antenna input, C is the carrier power and J/S is the
jamming-to-signal ratio. The J/S performance of a GNSS
receiver at its tracking threshold can be evaluated by the
following equation [11]:
୎
ୗ
= 10 log QRେቈ1/10଴.ଵቀిొబቁ౉ ౅ొ − 1/10଴.ଵቀిొబቁ቉ (4)
where ܳ is the processing gain adjustment factor and is equal
to 1 for Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), 1.5 for Spread Spectrum
Jammers (SSJ) and 2 for Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ),
and (C/N଴)୑ ୒୍ is the receiver tracking threshold (dB-Hz).
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted code,
the signal power at the band pass output is crushed into
approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing gain of
the GNSS receiver is given as:G୔ = 10 logቀଶେ౎୘ీ ቁ[dB] (5)
where CR is the chipping rate and Tୈ is the data period. For
the C/A-code this works out to be about 43 dB. Typical
avionics receivers have a cut off value at 10 dB, which means
that if the value is less than this the satellite signal level is too
low to be used in the positioning computations. Therefore, an
additional threshold criterion to be accounted for in the ABIA
system is given as:S/N୮୭ୱ୲ି ୡ୭୰୰. = S/N୮୰ୣ ିୡ୭୰୰. + G୮ ³ 10 dB (6)
In line with our discussion, the following additional thresholds
are set in the ABIA IFG:
 When G୮ is more than 11 dB (margin of 1 dB), the CIF
shall be generated.
 When G୮ is less than 9 dB (margin of 1 dB), the WIF
shall be generated.
During experimental flight test activities performed with
unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was also found
that, in a variety of dynamics conditions, a C/N଴ of 25 dB-Hz
was sufficient to keep tracking of the satellites [7].
Consequently, taking a 2 dB margin for the CIF, the following
additional criteria are adopted for S/N integrity flags:
 When the signal tracking errors are within 5% of the
maximum error budget tolerated by the receiver
[12-14], the CIF shall be generated.
 When the signal tracking loss conditions occur [13, 14],
the WIF shall be generated.
 When the C/N଴ is less than 27dB-Hz or the difference
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 12
dB, the CIF shall be generated.
 When the C/N଴ is less than 25dB-Hz or the difference
between the S/N and the processing gain is less than 10
dB, the WIF shall be generated.
IV. SBAS/GBAS INTEGRITY FLAG GENERATION
During the landing phase, a GNSS Landing System (GLS)
has to be augmented by GBAS in order to achieve the RNP, as
well as HPL and VPL requirements. In the case of Local Area
Augmentation System (LAAS), the system allows the adoption
of multiple Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS)
reference receivers. In order to perform a comparative
evaluation of the ABIA IFG module with GBAS and SBAS,
the GBAS/SBAS Integrity Flag Generation Processes (IFGPs)
are considered as illustrated in Fig. 3 and 4 respectively.
VPL and LPL for SBAS and GBAS are calculated in line
with the Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) for WAAS and LAAS [15, 16]. Additionally, [16]
provides the so-called Continuity of Protection Levels in terms
of Predicted Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels (PLPL and
PVPL). According to the LAAS MOPS, avionics-based
functionalities such as ABAS/ABIA would support
PLPL/PVPL calculations to generate appropriate caution flags.
In our research, we propose that a similar functionality be
implemented in SBAS and supported by the ABIA system
measurements.
Under these assumptions, the criteria for producing
SBAS/GBAS CIFs and WIFs are:
 When PVPLGBAS exceeds VAL or PLPLGBAS exceeds
LAL, the CIF shall be generated.
 When VPLGBAS exceeds VAL or HPLGBAS exceeds HAL,
the WIF shall be generated.
 When PVPLSBAS exceeds VAL or PLPLSBAS exceeds
LAL, the CIF shall be generated.
 When VPLSBAS exceeds VAL or HPLSBAS exceeds HAL,
the WIF shall be generated.
Fig. 3. GBAS IFGP.
As both GBAS and SBAS use redundant GNSS satellite
observations to generate integrity flags (i.e., 5 satellites for
LAAS and 6 satellites for WAAS), the number of satellites in
view can be used to set additional thresholds:
 When number of satellites in view is less than 5, the
GBAS CIF shall be generated.
 When number of satellites in view is less than 4, the
GBAS WIF shall be generated.
 When number of satellites in view is less than 7, the
SBAS CIF shall be generated.
 When number of satellites in view is less than 6, the
SBAS WIF shall be generated.
Fig. 4. SBAS IFGP.
V. SENSE-AND-AVOID
Cooperative and non-cooperative SAA are implemented to
address UAS safe integration into the non-segregated airspace
[17]. The SAA capability can be defined as the automatic
detection of possible conflicts (i.e., collision threats) by the UA
platform and the implementation of avoidance manoeuvres to
prevent the identified collision threats. As part of our research,
the possible synergies attainable with the adoption of different
detection, tracking and trajectory generation algorithms were
studied. The avoidance trajectory is generated considered the
use of on-board trajectory re-planning module with
dynamically updated constraints based on the intruder and the
host dynamics. Additionally, a unified approach to cooperative
and non-cooperative SAA is developed by determining the
overall uncertainty volume in the airspace surrounding the
intruder tracks. The analytical models adopted to compute the
overall uncertainty volume in the airspace surrounding an
intruder are described in [17]. Based on these mathematical
models, the SAA Unified Method (SUM) for cooperative and
non-cooperative SAA is developed [17]. In this unified
approach, navigation and tracking errors affecting the
measurements are considered and translated to unified range
and bearing uncertainty descriptors, which apply both to
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.
VI. ABIA/SAA SYTEMS INTEGRATION
The Position, Velocity and Attitude (PVA) measurements
are typically obtained by adopting multi-sensor data fusion
techniques [18]. An initial flight path is generated using the
aircraft dynamics model. The IFG module run is performed on
that trajectory. Based on a Boolean decision logic that sorts
sensors data based on estimated performance parameters, the
C-SAA or non-cooperative SAA sensors are used for safe
separation [17]. If both the safe separation thresholds are
violated and a mid-air collision threat is detected the WIF is
generated. To prevent any WIF, the flight path optimization
process starts when the first CIF is generated. Pseudo-Spectral
Optimisation (PSO) and Differential Geometry Optimization
(DGO) techniques are used to generate a new optimised
trajectory free of any integrity degradations. Depending on the
relationship between the available time-to-collision and the
computation time PSO and DGO trajectory solutions, the
optimised trajectory data are sent to the AFCS (and/or to the
ground pilot) for execution of the avoidance manoeuvres. In
the trajectory optimisation process time is used as the cost
functional and the aircraft dynamics model/satellite elevations
are used as path constraints. The implemented decision logic is
based on minimisation of the following cost function [19]:J = w୲ ∙ tୗ୅୊୉ + w୤න [SFC ∙ T(t)]dt − wୢ ∙ D୫ ୧୬ +
− w୧ୢ ∙ ∫D(t)dt (7)
where D(t) is the estimated distance of the generated
avoidance trajectory points from the avoidance volume
associated with the obstacle. D୫ ୧୬ is the min[D(t)] and
represents the estimated minimum distance of the avoidance
trajectory from the avoidance volume. tୗ୅୊୉ = t|ୈౣ ౟౤ is the
time at which the safe avoidance condition is successfully
attained. SFC [୩୥
୒
∙ s] is the specific fuel consumption. T(t) is
the thrust profile. w୲ , w୤, wୢ, w୧ୢ are the weightings attributed
to time, fuel, distance and integral distance respectively.
Boundary conditions are set based on the values of the flight
parameters when the CIF is generated. An alternate trajectory
free of integrity degradation is then generated and sent to the
AFCS and/or to the ground pilot.
VII. SIMULATION CASE STUDIES
Various simulation case studies were performed to evaluate
the performance of the ABIA IFG compared with GBAS
(LAAS) and SBAS (WAAS) IFG processes, and also to assess
the proposed ABIA/SAA integrated architecture. A GNSS
constellation simulator was implemented to support GNSS
satellite visibility, signal and geometry analysis. Using
CATIA-P3, a detailed aircraft 3-Dimensional Model (3DM)
was developed and an Aircraft Dynamics Simulator (ADS) was
implemented to generate the nominal flight path trajectory and
Euler angles. Terrain and Objects Data (TOD) was used to run
the MPS and using a DTED, it a detailed map of the terrain
beneath the aircraft was obtained. The Doppler Simulator
Module (DSM) was used to calculate the Doppler shift by
processing ADS and GCS inputs. The Multipath Analysis
Module (MAM) processed the 3DM, TEM, GCS and ADS
inputs to determine multipath contributions from the aircraft
(wings/fuselage) and from the terrain/objects close to the
aircraft. The Obscuration Analysis Module (OAM), and was
used to compute the GNSS antenna(e) masking matrixes for all
aircraft manoeuvres with inputs from the 3DM, GCS and ADS.
The GNSS constellation simulator (GCS) was developed to
calculate GNSS satellite position and velocity in the Earth-
Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference frame and to obtain
satellite visibility data from any point along the aircraft flight
trajectory. The GCS was implemented in MATLABTM and
Simulink to simulate GPS and GALILEO constellations. In
order to test the ABIA IFG module, a representative UA
trajectory was generated for the AEROSONDE UA including
the following flight phases:
 Climb phase (0-300s);
 Turning climb phase (300-600s);
 Straight and level (cruise) phase (600-900s);
 Level turn phase (900-1200s)
 Descending turn phase (1200-1500s);
 Final approach phase (1500-1800s);
The combined GPS/GALILEO constellation was simulated
and the GNSS receiver tracking loops were modelled with a
flat random vibration power curve from 20Hz to 2000Hz with
amplitude of 0.005gଶ/Hz and the oscillator vibration
sensitivity S஥(f୫ ) = 1 × 10ିଽ parts/g. All CIFs and WIFs
relative to antenna masking, geometric accuracy degradations,
SNR, multipath and Doppler shift were generated. The results
of this simulation are shown in Table I. In some cases, the CIF
was generated but it was not followed by the WIF (this was due
to a temporary adverse relative geometry not leading to GNSS
signal losses). During the level turn and turning descent
phases, the CIF was followed by the WIF. It was also observed
that the CIF was always triggered at least 2 seconds before the
successive WIF onset (up to 13 seconds in one case during the
turning descent phase). These results corroborate the validity
of the models developed for the CIF/WIF thresholds. It was
also observed that the CIF was always triggered at least 2
seconds before the successive WIF onset. Therefore, it is
envisaged that a properly designed ABIA FPM could take full
advantage of this predictive behaviour, allowing the UA to
correct its flight trajectory/attitude in order to avoid the
occurrence of critical GNSS data degradations/losses.
Additionally, it is possible that this predictive behaviour be
exploited in the pursuit of a GNSS based auto-landing
capability.
Assuming that all WIFs are true GNSS outages, we have
True Caution Time (TCT), False Caution Time (FCT), True
Caution Rate (TCR) and False Caution Rate (FCR) defined as:TCT = Time of WIF [sec] (8)FCT = Total CIF time [sec] − TCT (9)
TCR = ୘େ୘
୘େ୘ା୊େ୘
× 100% (10)
FCR = 1 − TCR (11)
Table I. IFG simulation results.
PHASE CIF WIF
Climb --- ---
Turning
Climb
334~374s,
426~446s
517~558s
---
Cruise 874~900s ---
Level
Turn
901~1200s
903~906s, 913s, 920~924s,
930~931s, 938~942 s, 948~949s,
956~959s, 966~967s, 974~977s,
984~985s, 992~995s, 1002~1003s,
1110~1113s, 1020~1021s,
1028~1031s, 1128~1129s,
1136~1139s, 1146~1147s,
1154~1157s, 1164~1165s,
1172~1175s, 1182~1183s,
1190~1192s, 1200s
Descending
Turn
1201~1441s,
1448~1464s,
1471~1487s
1494~1500s
1204s, 1223~1224s, 1247~1249s,
1272~1273s, 1296~1297s,
1320~1321s, 1344~1367s, 1368s,
1391~1392s, 1414~1415s,
1438~1439s, 1461~1462s,
1484~1485s
Final
Approach
1503~1800s 1504~1508s
Since SBAS and GBAS are integrated in the IFG, the
analysis is performed by flight phase and then a cumulative
measure is also obtained. The results are tabulated in Table II.
Table II. IFG simulation results.
PHASE TCT TCR FCR FCT
Climb --- --- --- ---
Turning
Climb
--- --- --- 104
Cruise --- --- --- 27
Level
Turn
70 18.9% 0.811 300
Descending
Turn
47 14.2% 0.857 282
Final
Approach
5 1.65% 0.983 298
All Flight
Phases
122 10.8% 0.892 1011
Fig. 5 illustrates a cooperative SAA test scenario in which
an AEROSONDE (ABIA host platform) UA and two intruders
B’
B
A
C
A
Host Platform ABIA/SAA
Intruder Platform
B
C
(AEROSONDE UAs) are heading for a collision. Three
different points are shown on the host platform trajectory:
 (A) SAA Break-off Point: Corresponding to the point
where the host UA initiates the avoidance trajectory
(commanded by the SAA system). The cost function
criteria adopted in this case is minimum time.
 (B) SAA Safe Manoeuvring Point: Corresponding to the
point where the host UA can manoeuvre safely (any
manoeuvre within its operational flight envelope) has 0
Risk-Of-Collision (ROC). The SAA cost function criteria
switches to minimum time and minimum fuel from this
point onwards to get back on the original (desired) track.
 (C) ABIA Re-join Point: Corresponding to the point where
the host UA re-joins the original (desired) track without
GNSS data degradations.
Fig. 5. Cooperative SAA scenario (3 UA platforms).
Based on the position uncertainty of the host aircraft an
optimised avoidance trajectory without any GNSS data losses
is constructed around the overall avoidance volume. In case of
jamming, the overall avoidance volume is obtained by
combining the tracking error of the jamming signal radiation
pattern (main lobe in the case of a directional jammer) and the
navigation error of the host platform. The optimised avoidance
trajectory is constructed tangential to the radiation pattern of
the jammer by taking into account the position uncertainty of
the host platform, as described in [10]. A simulation run
performed in MATLABTM in the presence of a low-power
omnidirectional GNSS personal jammer is shown in Fig. 6.
The jammer is placed at [95, 0, 0] m. The AEROSONDE
UA Aircraft Dynamics Model (ADM) was used for this
simulation. After the presence of jamming was identified and
the jamming source was located, two symmetric optimal
avoidance trajectories (ABC and AB’C) were generated based
on the cost function approach defined earlier. In this
simulation, the constraints imposed by ABIA in terms of RPAS
platform dynamics and GNSS satellite elevation angles were
considered to generate the optimised avoidance trajectories,
thus preventing degradation or losses of navigation data during
the whole jammer avoidance manoeuvre.
Fig. 6. Avoidance trajectory in the presence of an omnidirectional jammer.
These results confirm that ABIA contributes to providing
an Integrity-Augmented SAA (IAS) solution that is well suited
for an extension of the current GBAS/SBAS augmentation
network in a variety of mission- and safety-critical applications
including UAS SAA. The inclusion of ABIA thus provides
solid foundations for the development of a future SGAAN
architecture meeting the requirements for manned and
unmanned aircraft separation maintenance and collision
avoidance tasks for all flight phases.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A comparative evaluation of GNSS Avionics Based
Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) with Space-Based and
Ground-Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS/GBAS) was
presented in this paper. The integration of ABIA in cooperative
and non-cooperative SAA architectures leads to an Integrity
Augmented SAA (IAS) solution meeting some of the key
performance requirements for a safe and unrestricted access of
UAS to commercial airspace. Simulation case studies were
performed on the ABIA/SAA modules in various
representative scenarios, also including the presence of
omnidirectional jammers. According to the simulation results,
after the integrity caution flag is generated, the time available
for the pilot/autopilot to react (before the integrity warning flag
is generated), is sufficient for a variety of mission- and safety-
critical tasks. The ABIA integration into an existing SAA
architecture for cooperative and non-cooperative applications
proved that all mid-air collision threats were successfully
avoided by implementing suitable trajectory optimisation
algorithms. Further research is currently focusing on the
following main areas [17-19]:
 Extend the ABAS/ABIA concept to other navigation,
communication, surveillance and tracking applications.
 Investigate ABIA applications and possible evolutions
for Next Generation Flight Management System
(NG-FMS).
 Evaluate the potential of ABAS/ABIA to enhance the
performance of next generation Communication,
Navigation and Surveillance / Air Traffic Management
(CNS/ATM) systems for Performance/Intent Based
Operations (PBO/IBO) and Four-Dimensional Trajectory
(4DT) management.
 Study possible applications of the ABAS/ABIA concepts
to advanced mission planning and forensic applications.
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